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VIRGINIA COMMENTS
PRESENCE OF ACCUSED AT TRIAL
The right of an accused to be present at his trial is well-recognized.1
A recent federal case originating in Virginia, Near v. Cunningham,
2
involves this right. During the course of the trial the Commonwealth's
Attorney, the trial judge, and counsel for the accused, Near, went into
the judge's chambers and agreed that the jurors should not be kept
together during recesses or adjournments. The formal record showed
that Near was present at every stage of the trial, but he denied that he
was present at the conference. The jury found Near guilty of murder
and sentenced him to death. Near moved for a new trial on the ground,
among others, that the jurors had been prejudiced by remarks made
by spectators during recesses when the jury was free to mingle with
the crowd. The court denied the motion. The Supreme Court of Ap-
peals of Virginia affirmed the conviction, 3 and the United States
Supreme Court denied certiorari.4
Near then petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in the Supreme
Court of Appeals on the grounds that he was denied due process of
law in that he was in fact absent when the decision was made to allow
the jury to separate during recesses, and that the jury was prejudiced
by remarks heard during the recesses. The petition was denied.5
The Supreme Court of the United States denied certiorari.0 Near
then petitioned for habeas corpus in the United States States District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, which also denied the
petition. He then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals
'Various factors have been suggested as the basis for this right of an accused
to be present at his trial. They are: (a) to enable the accused to face the jury and
poll it, see Annot., 23 A.L.R.2d 456, 468 (1952) (b) the interest of the public in
the life and liberty of the citizen, Noell v. Commonwealth, 135 Va. 600, 115 S.E. 679
(1923); (c) the right to a trial by an impartial jury, People v. Medcoff, 344 Mich.
1o8, 73 N.W.2d 537 (955); (d) the right of an accused to be heard, Garver v. Com-
monwealth, 256 S.W.2d 375 (Ky. 1953); and (e) the right of confrontation, Hooker
v. Commonwealth 54 Va. (13 Gratt.) 763 (1855).
2313 F.2d 929 (4th Cir. 1963).
Near v. Commonwealth, 202 Va. 2o, 116 S.E.2d 85 (196o).
4Near v. Virginia, 365 U.S. 873 (1961).
'Near v. Cunningham, 2o3 Va. lxxxii (ig6i).
Near v. Cunningham, 369 U.S. 862 (t962).
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for the Fourth Circuit, which in a 2-1 decision,7 reversed and remand-
ed the case to the District Court for a hearing.8
Although there were several factors involved in the court's de-
cision, it did indicate that if Near was not present when the decision
to let the jury separate was made, then Near's constitutional right
of due process was violated.9 The Court of Appeals also observed that
the Virginia law closely guards the due process guarantee of the right
of an accused to be present at every stage of his trial. The District
Court has previously said that not every error in state procedure con-
stitutes a violation of federal due process.10 The question is thus
raised as to whether Near's absence was a violation of either Vir-
ginia law or due process.
The right of an accused to be present at his trial for a felony"
has long been regarded as fundamental. Historically, it was a ques-
District Judge Paul dissented on the ground that the allegations in the
petition had been considered and decided by the Virginia state courts. Near v.
Cunningham, 313 F.2d at 934.
6The District Court, after hearing on the petition, ordered the conviction
"vacated and set aside" because of a violation of due process. Near v. Cunningham
reported in Richmond Times-Dispatch, Sept. 11, 1963, p. 3 col. 1. When Near
was brought to trial again, this time without a jury, he pleaded guilty and was
sentenced to life imprisonment. Thus, Near's successful battle to escape the
electric chair stretched from May 27, 1959, when he was originally convicted, to
March 2, 1964, when he was sentenced to life imprisonment. Near spent the five
years on Death's Row, during which time he was granted ig stays of execution.
Commonwealth v. Near (Cir. Ct. Powhatan County, March 2, 1964) in Richmond
Times-Dispatch, March 4, 1964, p. 3, col. 4-
'The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, in denying the petition, stated
that the formal entries on the record indicated that the accused was present at
every stage of the trial, and that under the rules of the court the formal record
must be accepted. Near v. Cunningham, 313 F.2d at 93 o . The United States
Court of Appeals stated in the present case that had the Supreme Court of Appeals
of Virginia gone behind the formal record of the trial and held a hearing on
Near's claim, that Near might have convinced the Court that he was not present
when the decision was made, and "if the Court were so convinced, Near would
have been entitled to his writ." Near v. Cunningham, Id. at 931.
"0Owsley v. Cunningham, x9o F. Supp. 6o8, 611 (E.D. Va. 1961). There the
court stated, "Assuming, arguendo, that petitioner was entitled to be present at
the time of the presentation and argument of the motions and assuming further,
but without deciding, that the action by the state court on said motions affected
the interest of the petitioner, which is apparently the test for determining whether
the statute has been violated, this does not bring into focus the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. There may have been some error in the state
court practice and procedure, but the federal court is only interested in whether
there has been a denial of due process as guaranteed by the federal constitution."
"-This comment is limited to a discussion of the presence of the accused at a
trial for a felony. For misdemeanors, see Va. Code Ann. § 19-i-i8o, 19.1-184 (Repl.
Vol. 1950).
1964]
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tion of absolute necessity,12 and the principle existed at common law
as a necessary requisite to jurisdiction.13
In Virginia the right of an accused to be present at his trial is
insured by a statute, which provides in part:
"A person tried for a felony shall be personally present dur-
ing the trial.... But for the purpose of this section a motion
for a continuance, whether made before or after arraignment,
shall not be deemed to be part of the trial.'
u 4
This right cannot be waived,15 because unless the accused is present,
the court has no jurisdiction. Thus, in Virginia the accused not only
has a right to be present, he must be present.
In cases involving this right two questions must be considered: (i)
whether the accused was absent, and if so, (2) whether the proceeding
was a part of the "trial" referred to in the statute.
The rule in Virginia is that the accused must be present at any
time his interests are affected,' 6 from arraignment to sentence.7 The
'"rhe early methods in England for determining the accused's innocence or
guilt include trial by ordeal and trial by battle and would seem to require the
presence of the defendant. With the development of the jury system the accused's
presence was still necessary to present a case, to give the jury control over him,
and in order that he might elect to wage battle or to defend by oath with helpers.
Goldin, Presence of the Defendant at Rendition of the Verdict in Felony Cases,
16 Colum. L. Rev. 18 (1916).
""1"[F]rom the outset the common law courts have looked upon this as a neces-
sary prerequisite to jurisdiction. Without his presence a common law court had
no jurisdiction to commence a trial against a defendant, and it has become the
settled practice to regard the presence of the accused at every step of the trial as
necessary to the courts jurisdiction." Goldin, supra note 12, at 20. See also Noell v.
Commonwealth 135 Va. 6oo, is5 S.E. 679 (1923); Clark, Criminal Procedure § 148
(2d ed. 1918).
"Va. Code Ann. § 19.1-240 (Repl. Vol. ig6o). It has been stated that this
statute is merely declaratory of the common law. Williams v. Commonwealth, 188
Va. 583, 5o S.E.2d 407 (1948); Noell v. Commonwealth, 135 Va. 6oo, 115 S.E. 679
(1923).
"Noell v. Commonwealth, 135 Va. at 6o9, 115 S.E. at 681; Shelton v. Common-
wealth, 89 Va. 45o , 16 S.E. 355 (1892); Bond v. Commonwealth, 83 Va. 581, 3 S.E.
149 (1887); Jackson v. Commonwealth, 6o Va. (i9 Gratt.) 656 (1870).
16"[Tjhe test to be applied in determining whether or not the statute has been
violated is: Has the interest of the defendant been affected by the action of the
Judge?" Rogers v. Commonwealth, 183 Va. 19o, 194-95, 31 S.E.2d 576 (1944); see also
Carpenter v. Commonwealth, 193 Va. 851, 71 S.E.2d 377 (1952); Thomas v. Com-
monwealth, 183 Va. 501, 32 S.E.2d 711 (1945); Noell v. Commonwealth, 135 Va. 6oo
115 S.E. 679 (1923); Gilligan v. Commonwealth, 99 Va. 8M6, 37 S.E. 962 (goi).
"Palmer v. Commonwealth, 143 Va. 592, 130 S.E. 398 (1925); Fetters v. Common-
wealth, 135 Va. 5o, 115 S.E. 692 (1923); Noell v. Commonwealth, 135 Va. 6oo, 115
S.E. 697 (1923); Pierce v. Commonwealth, 135 Va. 635, 115 S.E. 686 (1923). "Gen-
erally stated, the rule is that he must be present on his arraignment, when any
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courts have been called upon to apply the rule to various situations.
These decisions have established certain guidelines in determining
when and under what circumstances the presence of the accused is es-
sential.
The Virginia court, in applying the rule, has determined that the
presence of the accused is essential at the time of entering a plea,' 8
at the selection of the jury,19 at the giving of testimony,20 at a jury
viewing of the scene of the crime, 21 at the charge to the jury,22 at
the rendition of the verdict,23 at a motion to set aside the verdict,24
and at various other proceedings. 25
Conversely, Virginia has held that the presence of the accused is
not essential at proceedings before arraignment,26 at the making of a
motion for a continuance,27 at the giving of extra-judicial or caution-
evidence is given or excluded, when the jury is charged, when the trial court
wishes to communicate with the jury in answering questions by them, and when
the jury receives further instructions. He must be present at every stage of the
trial proper." 143 Va. at 605, 13o S.E. at 402.
" Palmer v. Commonwealth, 143 Va. 592, 13o S.E. 398 (1925); Sperry v. Com-
monwealth, 36 Va. (9 Leigh) 623 (1838).
"Hampton v. Commonwealth, 19o Va. 531, 58 S.E.2d 288 (1950) (it is held
that the record did not show that the defendants were absent when the court
ruled on the qualifications of the jurors).
2Jackson v. Commonwealth, 6o Va. (19 Gratt.) 656 (1870).
OCrockett v. Commonwealth, 187 Va. 687, 47 S.E.2d 377 (1948); Fetters v.
Commonwealth, 135 Va. 5oi, 115 S.E. 692 (1923); Noell v. Commonwealth, 135 Va.
6oo, 115 S.E. 679 (1923); ;Pierce v. Commonwealth, 135 Va. 653, 115 S.E. 686
(1923).
=Clinton v. Commonwealth, 161 Va. 1048, 172 S.E. 272 (1931); Hagood v. Com-
monwealth, 157 Va. 9t8, 162 S.E. 10 (1932); Palmer v. Commonwealth, 143 Va.
592, 130 S.E. 398 (1925).
=Gilligan v. Commonwealth, 99 Va. 816, 37 S.E. 962 (igos); Jackson v. Com-
monwealth, 6o Va. (19 Gratt.) 656 (1870); Sperry v. Commonwealth, 36 Va. (9
Leigh) 623 (Gen. Ct. 1938).
2'Staples v. Commonwealth, 14o Va. 583, 125 S.E. 319 (1924); Bond v. Com-
monwealth, 83 Va. 581, 3 S.E. 149 (1887); Hooker v. Commonwealth, 54 Va. (13
Gratt.) 763 (1855.).
2Slater v. Commonwealth, 182 Va. 579, 29 S.E.2d 853 (1944) (in absence of the
accused the court examined clerk and had him sign writ of venire facias); Bowles
v. Commonwealth, 193 Va. 8M6, 48 S.E. 527 (1904) (accused absent when instructions
and indictment sent to jury room. The Supreme Court of Appeals said, "the correct
practice is that the indictment... instructions... other writings.., should be
delivered to them in presence of the prisoner and his counsel, that objection may
be made at that time, if there be objection.") 1o3 Va. at 837, 48 S.E. at 534; Sperry v.
Commonwealth, 36 Va. (9 Leigh) 623 (Gen. Ct. 1838) (accused absent during one day
of trial).
OKibler v. Commonwealth, 99 Va. 804, 26 S.E. 858 (1897); Boswell v. Common-
wealth, 61 Va. (20 Gratt.) 860 (1870.
The statute itself provides that a motion for a continuance is not a part of
the trial requiring the presence of the accused. Va. Code Ann. §19.1-240 (Repl. Vol.
1964]
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ary communications by the judge to the jury,2s and at various "admin-
istrative" proceedings. 29 Also, the accused does not have to be pres-
ent at a conference in the judge's chambers regarding instructions to
be given the jury30 or admissibility of proposed questions.
3 '
The situation in the Near case, assuming the absence of the ac-
cused when an agreement was made in the judge's chambers to allow
the jury to separate, has never been passed upon by the Virginia courts.
However, it seems so closely analogous to the situations previously
considered and decided involving out-of-court conferences,
3 2 that
no meaningful distinction can be made.
Firstly, in Near, as in the other out-of-court conference cases, the
conference took place in the judge's chambers, and so was not within
the hearing or presence of the jury, and was not a part of the "trial
proper." The court in Williams v. Commonwealth,
3 in considering
the absence of the accused from a conference in the judge's chambers,
stated, "We do not consider this conference in the judge's chambers
196o). See also Seymour v. Commonwealth, 133 Va. 775, 112 S.E. 806 (1922) (decided
under statute); O'Boyle v. Commonwealth, ioo Va. 875, 40 S.E. 121 (19o) (decided
before statute adopted); Kibler v. Commonwealth, 94 Va. 8o4, 26 S.E. 858 (1897)
(decided before statute adopted); Coleman v. Commonwealth, 90 Va. 653, 19 S.E. 161
(1894) (decided before statute adopted).
nThomas v. Commonwealth, 183 Va. o501, 32 S.E.2d 711 (1945) (accused absent
momentarily when judge admonished jury); Rogers v. Commonwealth, 183 Va. 19o,
31 S.E.2d 756 (1944) (judge told jury, while accused absent, that if any of them
wanted pajamas or anything to see sergeant, but not to telephone); Jones v. Com-
monwealth, 79 Va. 213 (1884) (accused absent when jury called in morning and
sent to jury room); Lawrence v. Commonwealth, 71 Va. (3o Gratt.) 845 (1878) (court
stated it wasn't necessary for accused to be present when jury was brought in, in
the morning and sent to the jury room.)
nNewberry v. Commonwealth, 191 Va. 445, 61 S.E.2d 319 (1950) (accused absent
when judge sent letter to counsel of his decision to overrule motion in arrest of
judgment); McClain v. Commonwealth, 189 Va. 847, 55 S.E.2d 49 (1949) (accused
absent when Sheriff measured map during a recess of court to determine proper
venue); Zimmerman v. Commonwealth, 167 Va. 578, 189 S.E. 144 (1937) (accused
absent from judge's chambers when prosecuting attorney discussed renewing his
motion to introduce previously excluded testimony); Thurman v. Commonwealth,
107 Va. 912, 6o S.E. 99 (19o8) (convicted accused absent when bill of exceptions
presented to the court and made a part of the record); Gilligan v. Common-
wealth, 99 Va. 816, 37 S.E. 962 (19o) (accused absent when counsel announced that
he had no bill of exception to offer); Weatherman v. Commonwealth, 91 Va. 796,
22 S.E. 349 (1895) (accused absent when judge signed order book).
=Carpenter v. Commonwealth, 193 Va. 851, 71 S.E.2d 377 (1952); Clinton v.
Commonwealth, 161 Va. 1084, 172 S.E. 272 (1934); Hagood v. Commonwealth, 157 Va.
918, 162 S.E. 10 (1932); Palmer v. Commonwealth, 143 Va. 592, 130 S.E. 398 (1925).
31Williams v. Commonwealth, 188 Va. 583, 50 S.E.2d 407 (1948).
"'See cases cited supra notes 30 and 31.
13188 Va. 583, 50 S.E.2d 407 (1948).
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to have been a part of the actual trial, and find no denial of any
right of the accused or error in the procedure adopted."
34
Secondly, the decision made in conference in the Near case, in the
accused's absence, was communicated to the jury in the accused's
presence. In Palmer v. Commonwealth35 the court, in considering
the absence of the accused from a conference in the judge's chambers
on instructions to be given the jury, stated:
"What the accused was entitled to was to be present when the
jury was instructed, not when the trial court judge was con-
sidering and preparing the instructions.... His rights can only
be affected after the trial judge has determined the legal ques-
tions so raised, and when he communicates the instructions to




In addition to these analogies between the Near situation and
other conference situations, there are other factors which make the
Near situation an even stronger one for not requiring the accused's
presence. In Near no decision was made in the conference without
the consent or agreement of the accused. There was no objection to
the court allowing the jury to separate, and the decision was made
with the agreement of the accused's counsel. And, as mentioned pre-
viously, the accused was present when the jury was told it could
separate, and there was no objection raised then. In the previous
conference situations, decisions were made in the accused's absence
which were without his consent and over his objections, and still
the accused's presence was not deemed essential. 37
Furthermore, in the conference cases where the presence of the
accused was held not to be essential, the decisions reached in con-
,1188 Va. at 593, 50 S.E.2d at 412. Further support of the view that the pres-
ence of an accused at a proceeding in the judge's chamber is not essential is given
by the court in Hagood v. Commonwealth: "He has no more constitutional right
to be present then, than he would have the right to be present at the judge's home,
should he continue the investigation and consideration of this matter there." 157
Va. at 928, 162 S.E. at 14.
3143 Va. 592, i3o S.E. 398 (1925).
C6143 Va. at 6o6, i3o S.E. at 402.
31In the cases where instruction to the jury were decided upon in the ac-
cused's absence, instructions were granted or denied against the wishes of the ac-
cused and over his counsel's objection. See cases cited supra note 3o. See also Wil-
liams v. Commonwealth, supra note 31, where in a conference in the accused's
absence the judge heard argument on the admissibility of a question sought to
be asked by the prosecution. The judge decided the question was admissible against
the contention of the accused's counsel, and over his objection.
19641
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ference were expected and intended38 to influence the jury's decision.30
A fortiori in the Near case, where the decision to allow the jury to
separate was not expected or intended to have any effect on the
jury's decision it would seem the presence of the accused would not
be essential.
The Court of Appeals inferred that Near's absence from the con-
ference would constitute a violation of due process if it were estab-
lished that the jury was thereafter prejudiced. This reasoning would
require the courts, when considering the accused's absence from such
a conference, to first determine whether the jury had actually been
prejudiced. However, the question of the jury being prejudiced is a
separate issue to be determined in its own right; if the jury has been
prejudiced, then the accused is entitled to a new trial. So, if the
court's reasoning was followed to its logical conclusion, the question
of the accused's absence would never be reached.40 It would seem,
therefore, that the question of the accused's absence should be con-
sidered independently of the question of whether the jury was there-
after prejudiced.
The court further pointed out that the conference was more than
a legal discussion to which the accused could not be expected to con-
tribute, that the decision to allow the jury to separate was a sur-
render of one of the accused's fundamental rights, 41 and that Near's
absence was therefore not a mere technicality. However, the accused
was present in the court when the judge informed the jury it could
-"Whether we regard the proceeding jury view of scene of crime as the taking
of evidence or merely as an explanation and illumination of the testimony given
or to be given to the court, no one can doubt that it is expected and intended
to have a material bearing upon the conclusions reached by the jury." 135 Va. at
618, 115 S.E. at 684.
3In the cases, where instructions to the jury were determined in conference,
the selected instructions were certainly intended to influence the jury in its decisi6n.
See cases cited in note 3o. See also Williams v. Commonwealth, supra note 31,
where the admissibility of a question was determined in a conference in the accused's
absence. There too, the question was expected and intended to have an influence
on the jury's decision, and the presence of the accused was still held not to be
essential.
4 Under the court's reasoning, if the jury was found not to have been preju-
diced, the consideration of the question ends because the accused's absence would
not violate due process. If it is found that the jury had been prejudiced, then the
court would need to go no further because this in itself is a violation of due process.
Thus, the question of the accused's absence is never reached.
"However, it does not appear that under the Virginia statute the accused has a
right to keep the jury together, but rather it is a matter within the judge's dis-
cretion. The statute provides: "In any case of a felony the jury shall not be kept
together unless the court otherwise directs." Va. Code Ann., § 19.1-213 (Repl.
Vol. 196o).
